

TURKEY'S INFLUENCE ON THE CULTURE AND IDENTITY OF BOSNIAKS

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ABSTRACT:

The paper examines the influence of Turkey's soft power on political and cultural events in Bosnia and Herzegovina, that is, the way in which Turkey uses Bosnia and Herzegovina to strengthen its own geopolitical position. In this sense, the focus of the research is directed towards questioning the impact of characteristic mechanisms of Turkish soft power (such as the doctrine of "strategic depth" and the concept of "sentimental diplomacy") on the formation and homogenization of national identity among Bosniaks in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In addition to the historiographical method, the research is based on the analysis of secondary data on the activities of Turkish politicians and humanitarian organizations in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The results of the research indicate that Turkish aid to Bosnia and Herzegovina is not aimed exclusively at Bosniaks, but that in cultural and every other sense, the biggest benefit from this aid is precisely Bosniaks, that is, Turkey in terms of promoting its own interests in the Western Balkans.

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Introduction

The history of the Bosnian people dates back to the Middle Ages and, like other Balkan nations, has been influenced by other cultures for centuries. The subject of this work, however, is modern history, so attention will be focused on the years after 1995, after the signing of the Dayton Agreement, which ended the civil war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It was then that the image of an independent Bosnian nation began to be built, one that is not part of another nation (as in the time of former Yugoslavia, Austro-Hungary), but a nation that has its own territory. Bosniak politicians and the national milieu faced a difficult challenge, because in a feuding community, they had to carve out a nation that had existed for centuries, but had been treated with neglect. This article presents Turkey's role in building the Bosniak identity after 1995, in the context of culture. Soft power and Turkish policy toward Bosnia will be discussed, as well as Turkey's help in rebuilding the nation's image among the Bosniaks themselves.

1. Turkish soft-power policy towards Bosnia and Herzegovina

In modern history, after the fall of the Iron Curtain, diplomacy and foreign policy turned to so-called “soft power”. After the exhausting arms race, and the space race, major powers decided to build new international relations more economically. This trend has significantly revitalised new regions in the world. During the Cold War, there was mainly talk of two superpowers - the United States and the Soviet Union, because they had the most resources, the largest armies, and the most modern technologies. The situation changed when the political map of the world ceased to be divided into the East and the West. New countries, outside the Christian culture, appeared among the significant players in the international arena. Asian countries like China, Japan, and India, but also countries where Islam is the dominant religion. And it is the latter religion that has become the dominant soft power factor of Muslim countries. They centre their activities around it and its culture, with the aim of making as many culturally similar countries as possible dependent on them, thus realising the original idea of the Caliphate Muslim state uniting all the followers of Islam in the world. Different countries approach this differently, with some of them using hard power, some of them using violence and pressure, and some of them taking advantage of soft power opportunities.

According to the definition of Joseph S. Nye who introduced the term of soft power, actions of this type are based on the ability to shape the preferences of others (Nye, 2007, p. 30). Among the factors that make up soft power, he mentions the culture of the state (it should be attractive, close to the state that is influenced by the action), and political values, including foreign policy (similar allies and similar directions of development) (Nye, 2007, p. 40). Thus, the goal of a state using soft power is to show itself as an attractive, trustworthy partner for cooperation. According to Nye’s research, states that are strong in the context of soft power are those that are guided by generally accepted norms in their law and governance (liberalism, autonomy, and rule of law), that have access to and the power to direct multiple channels of information, and whose international credibility is enhanced by their actions in international organisations and beyond (Nye, 2007, p. 6). Konstantin Kosachev elaborates on this definition, stating that soft power, in addition to promoting its own values, respects the values of its partners as well and is able, with regard to them, to cooperate (Kosachev, 2012). Accordingly, it is assumed that democratic states themselves possess soft power, although they use it to varying degrees. Following this thought further, it can be noted that the development of soft power takes place especially after the fall of the Berlin Wall. The development of democracy and the depolarisation of the world caused states to abandon costly hard power in favour of soft power. The tools that leaders use in soft power are much cheaper and, above all, somewhat embedded in the overall costs of state functioning: political means such as negotiations, talks, bilateral

agreements, economic means-subsidies, economic aid, cultural and ideological means-ideology, culture, and diplomacy (Zajac, 2004). The latter, in the context of public diplomacy, is particularly important, since its recipients is the public. Activities such as youth exchanges, support for education, and language learning in partner countries are intended to inspire confidence among ordinary citizens (Sumracz, 2008).

Trends related to soft power are studied by Ernest & Young (Rapid-growth markets soft power index) (Global Soft Power Index, 2022). The researchers detailed three categories that define soft power: global image, global integrity, and global integration. Global image is formed by the popularity/universality of language, export of cultural goods (music, movies, literature), number of Olympic medals, number of people and companies recognised worldwide (for people, the Times magazine list is used, and for companies the Fortune magazine list). Regarding global integrity, the following are taken into account: the degree of rule of law (World Bank ranking), freedom index (data is taken from Freedom House ranking), voter turnout, and CO2 emissions. Global integration, that is, tourism, immigration, the prevalence of English proficiency, and the number of universities on the Times Higher Education World University Ranking Index is meant to indicate how connected a country is to the rest of the world.

This article will focus only on the cultural soft power element of Turkey in Bosnia and Herzegovina. A common cultural tradition, the same history and, above all, religion - Islam - make Turkey an ideal partner for the Bosniaks. Another important fact is that the Bosniaks are still on the construction of their own identity in Bosnia, they want to create their cultural individualism and thus prove that they are a separate ethnicity.. Therefore, financial support from Turkey and its presence in the Balkans in general, as a descendant of the Ottoman Empire, is particularly important here. In addition, Turkey seems to be a good partner in accession processes to European and Euro-Atlantic structures, as it is the only Muslim country in the NATO and maintains close contacts with the European Union.

Turkey's soft power is guided by the concept of "strategic depth" (Davutoglu, 2015). Its main originator and implementer is A. Davutoğlu, who rightly assumed that Turkey's internal transformation should be carried out so that it becomes a reliable partner, and then other countries' policies can be engaged. A strong economy,¹ stable politics, and a well-functioning security sector² entitle Turkey to be a leader in the region. According to the concept of "strategic depth," Ankara is guided by four principles: zero problems with neighbours, multifaceted foreign policy, modern diplomacy, and strong bilateral relations with the countries of

¹ Until the economic crisis, the Turkish economy was considered the 16th economy in the world

² Turkey's Armed Forces are the second largest army in NATO and . the strongest army in the world (Dargin, 2012).

the region (Kaya & Karaveli, 2009). The basis for these challenges is Turkey's geographic location - between Europe, the Middle East, and Asia, as well as the legacy of the Ottoman Empire. These factors make Turkey position itself as a central state, the most suitable for talks. In recent years, the effects of the policy of "strategic depth" have been evident, that is, increased political, economic, and social influence, improved relations with some countries, the role of a key mediator in international disputes, and increased economic ties as well (Balcer, 2011).

2. Neo-Ottomanism

The idea of Ottomanism first appeared in the mid-19th century, and it was associated with the reform of the Ottoman Empire into a constitutional monarchy (Clayer, Grandits & Pichler, 2011, pp. 89-109), which in turn was the result of the change in the balance of power in the world after the Congress of Vienna. The main goal was to transform the Empire into a Western state in which every citizen was equal (Helvacı, 2010). This was, therefore, the first move in Turkey's history to so powerfully change its policies. Another development was the seizure of power by Halil Turgut Ozal in the late 1980s and early 1990s, who activated Turkey's foreign policy, drew it closer to its neighbours, engaged in international activities, and applied for membership in the European Union. These were innovative actions, and since then we can speak of the era of neo-Ottomanism, although the term was first used 10 years earlier to refer to Turkish actions in Cyprus (Karpas, 2002, p. 524). The Greeks, however, used the term in a negative context, portraying Turkey as an aggressor. Ultimately, however, neo-Ottomanism does not bear the hallmarks of forcible imposition of will, but rather of soft power by Turkey.

Turkey's modern foreign policy is based on several basic facts that make up neo-Ottomanism. First of all, it is a legacy of the Ottoman Empire, and therefore Turkey feels responsible for any area that belonged to it. This is especially true of the regions influenced by the Muslim religion brought by the Ottomans. Thus, these are the regions of Asia Minor, and the Caucasus, but of the Balkans as well, especially Kosovo, Albania, and Bosnia-Herzegovina. A common cultural heritage, a similar organisational structure give the Turks a sense of responsibility for the development of pan-Islamism, but in a different character than the Caliphate. It is more in the nature of spreading culture than religion. The second factor is Turkey's geographic location, given that it lies on the conventional border between the East and the West, between Christianity and Islam. But not only is this important, the most significant is its location from an economic and business perspective. Once, the main source of income for the Ottoman Empire was the Silk Road (Beckwith, 2011). Currently, this role is performed by the Bosphorus Strait. Turkey's biggest profits come from transporting energy and mineral deposits to the West (Kalehsar, 2019). Another factor that is somewhat related to the previously mentioned one,,

the Turkish economic miracle, is relevant here. Thanks to deliberate and long-term measures, Turkey has earned the name of the “Anatolian tiger.” For a dozen years or so, Turkey boasted economic growth that attracted foreign investors from different regions of the world.³ New measures have allowed Turkey to expand militarily and, thanks to massive investments in the armed forces, to become a trusted member of the NATO (Gunluk-Senesen, 2001). Demographics are also important, especially in this day and age. Turkey is the 17th most populous country in the world, and is projected to reach 93 million by the middle of this century, according to the Turkish Statistical Institute.

All these elements make Turkey resemble an empire again, but no longer a state that conquers and forcibly imposes its culture and religion on other countries. Turkey benefits from the legacy of the Empire and appearing with its aid, reminding that it is the ancestor of the Ottoman Empire, while the countries receiving its aid are its relatives who can count on them (Canpolat, Ucar & Karakaya, 2013).

3. Bosniaks nationalism after 1995

The Dayton Peace Agreement, which clearly emphasised the presence of the Bosniak ethnicity as a constitutional element of Bosnia and Herzegovina, was a watershed moment in building the image of the Bosniak ethnicity. Interestingly, the true consequence of this endeavour was and still is the consolidation of ethnic divisions in the political arena of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which from the point of view of the Bosniaks was to their advantage, since as the largest ethnic community in Bosnia they easily accumulate an electorate. The new constitution, which was an annex to the peace agreement, replicated the tenets of the First Bosniak Assembly - the existence of the Bosniak ethnicity (Bosnian professing Islam) was confirmed, as was the Bosniak language.⁴ The Dayton Agreement also realised the minimum goal of the Bosniaks, that is, the creation of a state within the borders of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and this with a declaration by Zagreb and Belgrade that they would not claim the territories. It would seem, therefore, that they were the winning ethnicity, but the huge war losses in Bosnia's cultural heritage and, above all, the ruling elite's lack of an idea to strengthen national unity among the Bosniaks meant that even a few years after the war it was difficult to talk about the identity of the Bosniak community (Mujadžević, 2017). The problem was complex because the former Yugoslavia had successfully fought nationalism in its

³ After the coup against Erdogan and the Covid 19 outbreak, the weakness of the Turkish economic system was noted.

⁴ After the war, the first books standardizing the Bosnian language began to appear - Orthography of the Bosnian Language (Pravopis bosanskoga jezika, Sarajevo 1996) by Senadin Halilovic, School Dictionary of the Bosnian Language (Školski rječnik bosanskoga jezika, Sarajevo 1999) by Dževad Jahić and Grammar of the Bosnian Language (Gramatika bosanskoga jezika, Zenica 2000) by three authors - Jahić, Halilovic and Ismail Palić.

republics, so for almost half a century efforts were made to suppress such behaviour. Generations of young people, who should now be rebuilding country, have read only brief mentions of Bosniaks in history books. In addition, after the war, there was a lack of money to rebuild the Ottoman architecture, as it was necessary to help the survivors in the first place. The international aid coming to the country focused on supporting reemigrants and providing them with security, and only a thought was given to restoring monuments and supporting the Bosniak culture.

The greatest challenge for the Bosniaks became a cultural goal - the homogenisation of the Bosniaks, separating their culture, and indicating its specificity and independence. The presence of Serbs and Croats with a strongly developed cultural identification, on the one hand, provided competition, and on the other hand, distinguished the Bosniak culture itself as "the other." Importantly, the Dayton Agreement mainly focused on institutional autonomy, rather than on issues of cultural autonomy, and thus gave a great deal of leeway for activities that deepened ethnic divisions. The politics of memory, so often used by peoples in the Balkans that build their identities in large part on victimisation, plays an important role here. In the case of the Bosniaks, the events of the 1992-1995 civil war are significant, with the most important events forming the Bosniak identity as follows - Srebrenica, the siege of Sarajevo, and the fighting for Mostar. The destruction associated with these events often entered the cultural zone, buildings, religious buildings, bridges, and monuments that were souvenirs of the Ottoman era in the area were destroyed. It therefore became important to rebuild what bound the Bosniaks together and what gave them their beginning, namely the heritage of the Ottoman Empire.

4. Turkish help to build Bosniak identity

The city of Mostar, which suffered greatly during the war, was particularly important in building the Bosniak culture. The demolition of the old bridge connecting the two banks of the River Neretva became a symbol. Already in 1994, that is, during the hostilities, a project for the reconstruction of Ottoman architecture buildings in Mostar was created, which became part of the Memorandum of Cooperation between the UNESCO and the Bosniak side (Goodey, 2003).⁵ The funds that were raised by the International Stari Most Foundation came primarily from Turkey. This was an important contribution to the Bosnian culture on the whole, as the bridge has long been a symbol of the Balkans, and it is Bosnia's most important landmark. The restoration of the bridge over the Drina in the town of Višegrad, raised by Sokollu Mehmed Pasha, was similarly meaningful (Obnovljen Most Mehmed-paše Sokolovića, 2015). This bridge is one of the most significant cultural and historical monuments in Bosnia and the Balkans from the period of

⁵ This is one of the first documents in which the Bosniaks appear as a party to an international agreement.

the Ottoman Empire. However, the structure is primarily known for Nobel Prize winner Ivo Andrić's work "Na Drini ćuprija" (The Bridge over the Drina). Its restoration was the most expensive project of the Turkish TİKA organisation, costing about 10 million BAM..

It should be noted that Turkey is not only involved in investments on the territory of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, but also takes care of the Islamic cultural property on the territory of the Republic of Srpska.. During the hostilities, 16 mosques were destroyed in the city of Banja Luka. A significant investment was the reconstruction of the Ferhat Pasha Mosque in the city. In 2001, a first attempt was made to restore the building, but this was met with protests from Serbian nationalists. After a dozen years, however, in 2016, the Muslim community lived to see the mosque reopened. It was an important moment, as a symbol of Islamic culture was restored in the Serbian city. The ceremony was attended by then-Turkish Prime Minister Davutoglu, who, addressing those present at the ceremony, said that Bosnia had 78 million Turkish friends (Davutoglu na otvaranju Ferhadije, 2016). In the following years, the Arnaudiya Mosque in Banja Luka was also successfully renovated. Thanks to Turkey's support, more than 8,000 more religious buildings in Bosnia and Herzegovina have been renovated, including the Emperor's Mosque in Foča, Koski Mehmed Pasha Mosque in Mostar, and Ćejvan-Ćehaja's Mosque in Mostar .

Turkey's support, however, is not limited to the restoration of religious architecture. Thanks to grants from TİKA, it was also possible to renovate the facilities of the Bosnia and Herzegovina Archives, which were destroyed by fire in 2014 (Zorlak, 2019). Turkish organisations, however, are primarily concerned with supporting the Bosnian population, but not only the Bosniaks. This is very important, because Turkey, as a major partner for the Bosniaks and a brother in the faith, presents itself as a protector, as it was during the Ottoman Empire. During Ramadan in 2022, Turkish NGOs prepared more than 900 packages to the needy in Srebrenica, Foča, Banja Luka, Glamoč, Pale/Prača, Kačun, Žepče, Zvornik, and Prijedor (Hadžić, 2022). The Turkish Agency for Development and Cooperation (TİKA) has also donated aid packages to 200 Ukrainian families who found refuge in Bosnia and Herzegovina after the war (TİKA uručila pakete pomoći, 2022). In addition, Turkey's social assistance is significant. As part of the project supported by TİKA, the consumables required to combat the pandemic were provided, and 500 liters of hand sanitisers were produced in cooperation with Maarif Schools of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in accordance with the formulation recommended by the World Health Organisation. The hand sanitizers were distributed to NGOs and organisations in the country, especially educational and healthcare institutions (TİKA Continues to Support, 2020). One of the more spectacular Turkish-funded projects that makes a huge contribution to the development of not only of Bosniak-related

structures but also of the whole country is the Sarajevo-Belgrade highway, which is co-financed by Turkey. Furthermore, cultural events, scientific symposiums, conferences, and concerts are organised to showcase the Turkish culture and strengthen ties between Turkey and Bosnia, referring to the shared heritage of the Ottoman Empire. An event aimed at the young is the “Dječiji festival” (The Children’s Festival) in the city of Zenica, which is organised by the “Yunus Emre” Institute, and is the culmination of the “Moj izbor je turski” (My Choice is Turkish) project, in which several thousand Bosnian schoolchildren learn Turkish.

It should be noted that Turkish funds flow to Bosnia not only on the basis of unilateral tributes. Turkey is an important business partner as well. Currently, the annual trade between Bosnia and Herzegovina and Turkey is about 1.1 billion BAM (564 million euros) (Voloder, 2021). With the Free Trade Agreement, Turkey has provided Bosnia and Herzegovina with the most favourable conditions for trade. The government of the Republic of Turkey has decided to provide Turkish companies investing in Bosnia and Herzegovina with the same incentives and benefits they receive when investing in Turkey (Izetbegović: *Turska je značajno*, 2014). The most important investments from the Republic of Turkey are those in the Natron Hayat Ltd. Maglaj, the Sisecam soda Lukavac, and the opening of the Turkish Ziraat Bank Bosnia PLC. Sarajevo. The FIPE informed the eKapija.ba portal that the purchase of the the Vijenac Lukavac Limestone Mine along with the Lukavac Cement Factory.

5. Turkish aid organisations operating in Bosnia

The most well-known and popular Turkish organisation that provides assistance in Bosnia, but also in other countries, is TIKa (Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Organization). During its 25 years of activity in Bosnia and Herzegovina, it has implemented more than 900 projects. Thanks to its financial support, it has been possible to restore not only Muslim sites. One of the more spectacular projects, among others, was the restoration of the Fojnica Franciscan Monastery and elements of the Cathedral Church of the Nativity of Our Lady in Sarajevo. TIKa has also made a major contribution to education in Bosnia (Mujadžević, 2017, p. 127). Thanks to it, among other buildings, the “Safvet-bey Basagic” Elementary School in the town of Novi Travnik, the village of Pistaline in the Municipality of Bosanska Krupa, the village of Brijesnica Mala in the Municipality of Doboj Istok, the Elci Ibrahim-Pasha madrasah in the city of Travnik were renovated, and in 2017, 6 schools for children with special needs were put into operation. In addition, TIKa also supports the Bosnian health care by renovating and even building hospitals, hospital wards, and outpatient clinics from scratch. Its assistance has benefited patients in Visoko, Konjic, Goražde, Hadžići, and Sarajevo. TIKa has also been involved in the development of agriculture in Bosnia, providing tools and

knowledge to Bosnian ranchers and farmers. In 2009/2010, it led a programme for the development of beekeeping in the Dobož-Zenica canton. In 2014, it supported the cultivation of raspberries in the Zavidovići region and walnut cultivation in eastern Bosnia. It has funded several hundred families with greenhouses and crop irrigation systems. TIKa's activities are thus aimed at making the people of Bosnia more independent. In addition, it takes an active part in retraining and retrofitting the services of police and fire departments in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Šećerović-Kasli, 2021). No wonder, then, that the TIKa logo is so recognisable in Bosnia.

One organisation that has been serving to spread the Turkish culture in Bosnia for years is the "Yunus Emre."⁶ The range of its activities is wide, but its best-known project is "Moj izbor je turski." As part of this project, it supports Bosnian schools with teaching aids. Over the past 6 years, it has donated 40,000 fully equipped backpacks to Bosnian students, and more than 100 computers, projectors, and smartboards have been purchased. 3,500 students were able to go on a trip to Turkey, where all costs were paid for: transportation, accommodation, food, and attractions and entrance fees. The Turks Abroad And Related Communities (YTB) organisation, which runs a scholarship programme around the world, is involved in spreading education, the development of Turkish studies, and the general development of science. By 2021, 565 scholarships were awarded to Bosnian citizens with doctoral degrees, 72 doctoral scholarships, 182 to students, and 172 to academics.

Also important is the so-called Turkish conversion of the military mission to EUFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This institution has been operating in Bosnia and Herzegovina since 1993, and since then it has implemented around 400 social and infrastructural projects, along with 82 educational projects and 26 in the area of health care (Analiza koja razotkriva, 2022). It is in these local activities that the Turkish presence in Bosnia and Herzegovina is most noticeable. It is important here to mention bilateral assistance projects between individual Turkish and Bosnian municipalities. The sports hall of the "Sheikh Effendi Hadzijamakovic" Elementary School, Bakr- baba's Mosque, the Visoko Cultural Centre, the Mevlevi Cultural Centre in the Sarajevo borough of Kovači, and many other local investments were funded by Turkish municipalities (Lazić, 2017).

Significant assistance, in the area of humanitarian aid, to the inhabitants of Bosnia and Herzegovina, but not only, is provided by the Turkish "Red Crescent". After the end of the war in 1995, this organisation became particularly involved in ongoing assistance to the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina.. In these donations,

⁶ The Yunus Emre Foundation is a public benefit foundation established by resolution number 5653 of May 5, 2007. Among the main tasks of this foundation are: promoting the language, history, culture and arts of Turkey; providing information to all those interested in the above subjects, teaching the Turkish language, culture and arts of Turkey outside of Turkey, and strengthening friendship between Turkey and other countries through cultural exchanges.

supplies of medicines, blankets, clothing, tents, hygiene products, and food were sent from Turkey... This aid is still given to the most needy Bosnians, but also to migrants, staying in centres in Bosnia (Vučjak Camp). The Red Crescent was also involved in helping flood victims in 2014. At that time, 39 trucks and one cargo plane were donated to the residents of the municipalities of Brčko, Bijeljina, Orašje, Tuzla, Maglaj, Doboј, Prijedor, and Žepče. The organisation was also involved in helping fight the Covid-19 pandemic, donating essential medical equipment to Bosnia and Herzegovina.

By 2021, Turkey, in various types of projects, had donated more than \$500 million to Bosnia. These were funds from both state agencies and NGOs, as well as spontaneous collections. The largest financial contribution came from TIKА, whose projects absorbed a budget of \$400 million. Importantly, this money was not directed only to Bosnia's Muslim population. However, it is a kind of PR stunt when Turkey, as a Muslim country, the patron country of Bosniaks, funds, for example, the revitalisation of Christian religious sites. In this way, the Bosniaks can present these activities as related to them. But above all, as helping Islam, the religion that determines them. They are eager to refer to the fact that their brothers in faith have contributed so much to rebuilding Bosnia and improving the quality of life of its citizens. So in this way they build their identity based on religious differences and cultural proximity to Turkey.

Conclusion

Ethnic identity is built up over the years, it is based on language, culture and history. The Bosniaks, in fact, have been under someone else's rule for centuries, and, despite this, they have tried to preserve their individuality, which often ended up mixing cultures anyway. After 1995, the Bosniaks faced a huge opportunity and challenge, finally having their own state. Unfortunately, it was in ruins as a result of the war effort, and emergency aid to citizens came to the fore, and there was a lack of internal consensus and some idea of community-building among the Bosniaks. Happily, at that time, Turkey changed its orientation to a pro-Western one and began to implement the concept of "strategic depth," a part of which was concern for the regions that belonged to the Ottoman Empire, and thus for Bosnia and Herzegovina. The common denominator for Turkey and the Bosniaks became Islam, whose image was badly tarnished after 2001. This cooperation was beneficial to both sides. Turkey was able to establish itself as an important player in the region, was able to pursue the idea of Neo-Ottomanism, and spread the legacy of the Ottoman Empire. And the Bosnians and the Bosniaks received tangible help. However, Turkey's assistance was particularly important for Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina. First and foremost, assistance in the restoration of Ottoman architectural monuments, to which the Bosniaks can appeal. In addition, all kinds

of social assistance, not only to the Muslim population. The presence of logos of Turkish foundations, in which the crescent is always present, makes Islam even more visible in Bosnia, and it is this religion, after all, that mainly distinguishes the Bosniaks, from Serbs and Croats. Undoubtedly, Turkey's assistance has helped unite the Bosniaks and enabled them to distinguish themselves culturally. Moreover, it has helped present Islam as a religion that supports the poor and helps everyone, regardless of faith.

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UTICAJ TURSKE NA KULTURU I IDENTITET BOŠNJAKA

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APSTRAKT:

U radu se razmatra uticaj meke moći Turske na politička i kulturna dešavanja u Bosni i Hercegovini, odnosno način na koji Turska koristi Bosnu i Hercegovinu kako bi ojačala vlastiti geopolitički položaj. U tom smislu, fokus istraživanja je usmjeren ka propitivanju uticaja karakterističnih mehanizama meke moći Turske (poput doktrine „strategijske dubine“ i koncepcije „sentimentalne diplomatije“) na formiranje i homogenizaciju nacionalnog identiteta kod Bošnjaka u Bosni i Hercegovini. Pored istoriografskog metoda, istraživanje je zasnovano i na analizi sekundarnih podataka o djelovanju turskih političara i humanitarnih organizacija u Bosni i Hercegovini. Rezultati istraživanja ukazuju da Turska pomoć Bosni i Hercegovini nije usmjerena isključivo ka Bošnjacima, ali da u kulturološkom i svakom drugom smislu najveću korist od te pomoći imaju upravo Bošnjaci, odnosno Turska u smislu promocije vlastitih interesa na prostoru Zapadnog Balkana.

Ključne riječi:

Bosna i Hercegovina, Bošnjaci, Turska, meka moć, TIKA, Yunus Emre

